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ABSTRACT 
This paper applies Gini and concentration coefficient decomposition as well as the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke poverty index and a welfare function to new data from Burkina Faso to test the relationship 
between long-distance international migration and internal migration within the African continent and 
inequality, poverty, and social welfare in rural households. Findings support our theoretical expectation 
that this relationship varies by migrant destination. We find evidence of a negative correlation between 
internal migration and inequality and a positive correlation between international migration and 
inequality. International migration, which involves high costs and risks, appears to be mainly accessible 
to already wealthy households. Comparatively high remittances from this form of migration are 
associated with greater inequality. We also find that although international migration is associated with a 
much lower incidence, depth, and severity of poverty, its impact on social welfare is limited because the 
beneficiaries of international migration do not include the rural poor.  




1.  INTRODUCTION  
Migration has been identified as a pathway out of poverty for rural households in developing countries 
because it provides households with a source of income uncorrelated with agricultural income and 
reduces consumption pressure (World Bank, 2007). Recent research suggests that household members 
who migrate can facilitate investments in new activities by providing rural households with liquidity, in 
the form of remittances, as well as income security, in the form of a promise to remit in the event of an 
adverse income shock. That is, migration can reduce poverty by enabling rural households to overcome 
imperfect credit and insurance markets. However, the beneficiaries of migration may not include the rural 
poor. It has been suggested that more risky and costly long-distance international migration, which is also 
the most lucrative in terms of remittances, is most accessible, at least initially, for the wealthiest of the 
rural population. If this hypothesis is correct, the presence of a long-distance migrant in a particular 
household may well be associated with a lower level of poverty in that household, but also with greater 
interhousehold income inequality when compared with nonmigrant and internal migrant households.  
The relationship between migrant remittances and income inequality in developing countries has 
been the focus of considerable economic research, and linkages between migration, remittances, and 
poverty—long ignored in the development economics literature—have recently been explored. However, 
until now not much has been written on Africa (notable exceptions include Azam and Gubert [2006], 
Wouterse and Taylor [2008], and Mesnard [2004]), and findings concerning the relationship between 
migration, inequality, and poverty have often been contradictory, partly due to a lack of differentiation 
between the various forms of migration. Although the different contributions to the sending economies 
made by migrants to destinations outside the African continent and migrants within the African continent 
are  increasingly recognized, studies that address this distinction in their analyses of the relationship 
between migration, inequality, and poverty are rare in general, and virtually nonexistent for Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
This study uses econometric methods and new data from Burkina Faso to explore the relationship 
between migration, poverty, and inequality. The analysis is based upon unique new data collected by the 
author in a 2003 survey of 223 households in four villages situated on the Central Plateau of Burkina 
Faso. Burkina Faso, a country where conditions for agriculture are far from favorable, has a long history 
of migratory movement. In West Africa, the distinction between internal and international migration is 
often blurred by a close cultural affinity between homogeneous peoples on opposite sides of national 
borders—which leads migrants to regard intraregional migration merely as an extension of internal 
movement (Adepoju, 2007). To allow for comparability of results, following Adams on Pakistan (1998), 
De la Briere, Sadoulet, De Janvry, and Lambert (2002) on the Dominican Republic; and Mora and Taylor 
(2006) on Mexico, when analyzing migration impacts I make a distinction between long-distance 
international migration and internal migration within the African continent.  
I  test separately the effects of internal and long-distance international migration on poverty, 
interhousehold inequality, and welfare using Gini and concentration coefficient decomposition, the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty index, and the Stark-Yitzhaki welfare index. Results show that long-
distance international migration is associated with higher village income inequality, while the opposite 
holds for internal migration. Long-distance international migration is associated with much lower 
incidence, depth, and severity of poverty. However, the lack of diffusion of international migration among 
poorer households limits its potential for poverty reduction and welfare improvement.  
We begin by presenting, in Part 2, a discussion of empirical work on the relationship between 
migration, inequality, and poverty, including the diffusion hypothesis, which may partly explain the 
negative association between international migration and poverty encountered in the literature. Part 3 
describes the study area and data. Part 4 presents our methodology, including the Gini and concentration 
coefficient decomposition, poverty measures, and social welfare function used to explore the relationship 
between internal and international migration, inequality, and poverty. It provides the conceptual basis for 
the empirical analysis. Part 5 reports our findings on the relationship between migration, inequality, and 
poverty. We conclude in Part 6 by discussing some of the implications of our findings for understanding 
the influences of migration on income inequality and poverty in source areas. 2 
 
2.  RESEARCH ON REMITTANCES, INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY 
The interactions between migration, poverty, and changes in income distribution are of primary interest to 
researchers and policymakers, and have been well studied in the past (e.g., Lipton [1980]; Stark, Taylor, 
and Yitzhaki [1986]; and De Haan [1999]). Adams and Page (2005) use cross-section data from 71 
developing countries to show, after instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international migration 
and controlling for various factors, that remittances from international migration are associated with a 
much lower level, depth, and severity of poverty in the developing world. In rural Egypt, for example, the 
number of poor households was found to decline by 9.8 percent when predicted per capita household 
income included international remittances (Adams, 1986). For Burkina Faso, Lachaud (1999) 
demonstrated that the percentage of the population living below the poverty line was reduced by 7.2 
percent in rural households as a result of international remittances from Côte d’Ivoire.  
A number of studies have investigated the distributional effects of migrant remittances by using 
income-source Gini decompositions. Adams, for example, in his study on rural Egypt (1989; 1991), found 
that international remittances made only a very small contribution to overall income inequality. Others 
have compared Gini coefficients with and without migrant remittances. Oberai and Singh (1980), for 
example, found for the Indian Punjab that urban-to-rural remittances widened the gap between rich and 
poor in the rural areas. For Kenya, Knowles and Anker (1981) found that urban-to-rural remittances had 
very little effect on the overall distribution of income. Barham and Boucher (1998) found for Nicaragua 
that migration and remittances increased income inequality when compared with the no-migration 
counterfactual, but they did not distinguish between different destination of migrants.  
Most of the studies mentioned above confined the analysis of the impact of migration on 
inequality and poverty to remittances. There are theoretical reasons to suppose that the direct impact of 
migrant remittances does not represent the full impact of remittances on income inequality and poverty. 
New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) suspects that the effects of migration on activity choice and 
income in an incomplete market environment may be important. Household members who migrate may 
enable households to overcome imperfect credit and insurance markets and stimulate diversification into 
nonfarm activities by remitting (Stark, 1991). Migration may also compete with other household activities 
for scarce family resources, including time. However, whereas migrants’ net remittances are not likely to 
represent the full effect of migration on village income inequalities and poverty, they do constitute 
perhaps the most important direct impact of migration on village household incomes, are relatively easily 
measured, and are a logical and useful starting point for understanding the distributional consequences of 
migration for migrant sending areas (Stark, Taylor, & Yitzhaki, 1988). 
The impacts of migration and remittances may be different for different migrant destinations. 
Two migrant destinations must be distinguished when studying the impact of migration in West Africa: 
international migration to Europe and internal migration within the African continent. Migration to distant 
labor markets generates large amounts of remittances but usually entails a relatively long-term loss of 
labor and high costs, particularly in the form of transport, and risks associated with border crossing, often 
attempted without documents. Internal migration is less costly but generates comparatively few 
remittances.
1 Internal migration is expected to involve poorer households, which engage in migration at a 
low cost as a survival strategy in response to income shortfalls. Given the higher costs and risks, 
migration to international destinations is postulated to be an accumulation strategy involving households 
at the upper middle or top of the sending area’s income distribution. If only relatively wealthy households 
are able to engage in migration, remittance income from these migrants would accrue to the already 
better-off and would increase income inequality in the source area. If richer households gain both 
absolutely and relatively more from migration and remittances than do poorer households, then, despite 
sizable remittances, the role of international migration in poverty alleviation and welfare improvements 
may be limited.  
                                                      
1 There are only a limited number of observations on the costs of migration.  Households spent about 200,000 FCFA (West 
African Franc) per international migrant and between 3,000 and 7,000 FCFA per internal migrant.   3
3.  DATA  
Data used to test the association of internal and international migration with interhousehold inequality and 
poverty are from a household survey conducted in four villages in Burkina Faso in February and March 
2003. The four villages are situated on the Central Plateau—Niaogho and Béguédo in the south and 
Boussouma and Korsimoro in the north. The Central Plateau constitutes the central region of Burkina 
Faso, where the intensity of soil use is high compared with other regions. High population density is said 
to have led to a saturation of space in this region, and lands on the Central Plateau are generally 
overexploited and degraded (Brasselle, Gaspart, & Platteau, 2002; Breusers, 2001; Reyna, 1987).  
Households were selected as randomly as possible in the absence of any preexisting census maps. 
After mapping a village, each enumerator was sent out in a different direction to select households at an 
equal distance from one another, ensuring that all peripheral areas were covered. Farm households in the 
four villages can generally be described as extended, as, in a polygamous setting, they often comprise not 
only the household head and his wives, but also their grown sons along with their wives and children. 
Family members were included in the extended household definition on the basis of living in the same 
compound and normally eating meals together.  
Agriculture (staple cropping, cash cropping, and livestock) is the primary activity of the 
households. Cropping is characterized by a single short cropping season per year. Labor productivity 
tends to be low. There is a general lack of irrigation, rainfall is low, and soils are generally poor (Kessler 
& Geerling, 1994). The consequence of engaging in rainfed agriculture in a drought-prone environment is 
that households face substantial risk. Formal crop insurance is not available to mitigate this risk in the 
West African semi-arid tropics (WASAT). The lack of such insurance is thought to be due to the high 
spatial covariance of rainfall shocks and to moral hazard problems associated with crop insurance in 
general (Reardon, Delgado, & Matlon, 1992).  
The lack of collateral is compounded by the absence of a land market. In rural Africa, land 
markets often barely function and are generally quite thin (Lanjouw, Quizon, & Sparrow, 2001). In 
Burkina Faso, commercial land market transactions were found to be extremely rare (Ouedraogo, 
Sawadogo, Stamm, & Thiombiano, 1996). Udry (1999), using a four-year panel study (ICRISAT) of 
households in three different agroclimatic zones of Burkina Faso, found evidence for a missing land 
market when testing for profit maximization in agriculture. In the study villages, where high population 
density has led to land scarcity (Kessler & Geerling, 1994), not a single land transaction was 
recorded in the data. The lack of commercial land market transactions implies that land cannot function 
as collateral for credit. 
Uncertainty combined with a lack of markets for risk creates incentives to diversify income-
generating activities. Diversification of activities enables a household to reduce the risk it faces by 
generating income from sources not correlated with cropping income. Specific characteristics of the 
WASAT include a scarcity of low-barrier-to-entry labor-intensive jobs due to an underdeveloped farm 
labor market and predominantly traditional production technologies using family inputs (Reardon & 
Taylor, 1996). Households in the study area diversify their income by engaging in migration, livestock 
production, and nonfarm activities.  
Poor WASAT households appear to face important entry barriers to capital-intensive subsectors 
(Reardon & Taylor, 1996). If, as is widely believed, risk aversion decreases with income and wealth, then 
the poor will display a greater demand for diversification, other things being equal (Barrett, Reardon, & 
Webb, 2001). However, if diversification is costly (i.e., has high entry barriers) and initially risky, 
wealthy households are likely to be in a better position to diversify into noncrop activities.  
In agrarian societies, the major form of wealth is land. In the absence of a land market, 
landholdings are a more suitable indicator than income for assessing the ability of households to 
diversify. Table 1 shows income composition and participation across landholding quintiles. Consistent 
with agricultural household theory (e.g., Singh, Squire, and Strauss [1986]), net income from each 
household production activity was calculated as total revenue minus the costs of purchased inputs. For   4
crop production this includes the value of subsistence output, using the average local price received by 
sellers of the crop. The livestock income calculation takes into account the net change in value of herds as 
well as the sale of animal products. 
Table 1. Income composition across landholding quintiles (2002) 
Quintile 
Income 
















Lowest   35,387   49 (100)
b  8 (53)  6 (36)  31 (62)  6 (51)  0 (0) 
Second   46,527  52 (100)  9 (56)  4 (51)  22 (71)  8 (56)  6 (13) 
Third   41,492  56 (100)  12 (68)  7 (64)  18 (64)  4 (50)  4 (14) 
Fourth  52,084  51 (100)  10 (64)  7 (53)  16 (53)  7 (47)  10 (20) 
Highest   66,337  53 (100)  10 (75)  6 (75)  17 (68)  2 (48)  12 (25) 
Source: Author’s survey 
Notes: Migrants are not included as household members. 
a 168 FCFA=$1 (PPP 2002) (World Bank, 2005) 
b The figures in parentheses are the percentage of households in the income quintile that participated in the respective activity. 
The village surveys revealed two principal types of migrant destination: internal and long-
distance to Europe. Households from all four villages engage in internal migration. Households in 
Niaogho and Béguédo also participate in migration to Europe. Internal migrants are generally young men 
who attempt to find work elsewhere on the African continent. The primary destination of internal 
migrants from the surveyed villages until recently was Côte d’Ivoire. However, the migrant flow to Côte 
d’Ivoire has all but ceased, due to the unstable political situation, ethnic tensions, and antiforeigner 
sentiment there. Many Burkinabe now migrate to the capital of their country, Ouagadougou. International 
migration to Europe from Niaogho and Béguédo in nearly all cases is comprised of young (Bissa) males 
who go to Italy, initially to engage in horticulture around Naples. This form of migration is highly 
lucrative in terms of remittances sent back to the household; however, it involves high entry costs, 
particularly for transportation.  
Migration, by providing households with a source of income that is uncorrelated with agriculture, 
can facilitate investments in other activities. However, migration itself represents a diversification 
strategy with costs and risks that are greater for international migration. Because of this, it is likely that 
only comparatively wealthy households (at least initially) are able to engage in this form of migration. 
Table 1 shows that household participation in internal migration is prominent in the households that are 
poorest in terms of land, whereas long-distance international migration is most common among 
households in the upper land quintiles.  
Households in the four villages can be grouped on the basis of their migration status: nonmigrant, 
internal migrant, and long-distance international migrant.
2 An overview of the endogenous income and 
participation variables by household migration status (nonmigrant, internal, and international) is given in 
Table 2.  
   
                                                      
2 Within the group of internal migrants, a t-test reveals that remittances of migrants within and outside Burkina Faso (but 
within Africa) do not differ significantly, supporting the merging of these forms of migration into one group.   5
Table 2. Income per capita from different activities by household migration status (2002) 









  42,621 47,060 67,803 
Staple cropping  24,420 (100)
b 26,219 (100)  22,168 (100) 
Cash cropping  4,940 (66)  4,604 (64)  6,031 (88) 
Livestock
  2,710 (37)  2,327 (57)  4,313 (97) 
Nonfarm activities  10,551 (61)  9,024 (72)  7,779 (41) 
Remittances  ~  4,886   27,512  
Notes:  Migrants are not included as household members. 
a 168 FCFA=$1 (PPP 2002) (World Bank, 2005) 
b The figures in parentheses are the percentage of households in the income quintile that participated in the respective activity. 
The three household groups display differences in both per capita income and activity mixes. 
Remittance income of households with international migrants is about six times that of internal migrant 
households. Almost all households with international migration own livestock, but participation in 
livestock production is much lower for households without migrants and those with internal migrants. 
Participation rates in nonfarm activities are lower among households with international migrants than 
among the other two groups.   6
4.  METHODOLOGY 
Four types of analyses will be carried out to shed light on the relationship between remittances from 
internal and international migration and income inequality and poverty. We first use income data to 
construct a Gini and concentration coefficient decomposition. A modification of the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (1984) poverty index is then used to analyze the poverty implications of remittances. We 
follow Taylor, Mora, Adams, and Lopez-Feldman (2005) and others in their analysis of migration and 
poverty in Mexican rural households and take into account the incidence, depth, and severity of poverty. 
Finally, we use the Stark-Yitzhaki welfare index to assess the relationship between migration and social 
welfare.  
Migration and Inequality 
To explore the correlation between remittances from internal and international migration and rural income 
inequality, we need to select an inequality index. Although various indices exist, the Gini is probably the 
most intuitive and allows for decomposition by income source (Taylor et al., 2005). If we let   
   ,….     represent   components of household income, and if we define total income as   ∑   
 
    , 
we can write the extended Gini coefficient for village incomes as a function of the covariance between 
income and its cumulative distribution: 
    
2     ,     
                                                                             1  
where     is the mean of total income   and      is the cumulative distribution of total incomes in the 
village. If we utilize the properties of covariance, we can write equation (1) as 
    
2∑       ,       
   
             
 
   
                                                       2  
In equation (2),     is the share of income from source    in total income,         /    and    is the 
Gini correlation of income from source   with the distribution of total income, and    is the Gini index 
corresponding to the distribution of income from source  .
3 
    
      ,     
      ,      
                                                                        3  
Equation (2) enables us to decompose the role of remittances in inequality into three terms: first, 
the magnitude of remittances relative to total income; second, the inequality of remittances; and third, the 
correlation of remittances with total income (Stark et al., 1986). We can then calculate the effect of a 
small percentage change in any one component on the Gini of total income. Taking household labor and 
production decisions as given, if we increase an income source   by a factor   such that          1 
    , the marginal effect on the Gini of total income is  
   
  
                                                                                 4  
where   ,   ,    and    are measured prior to the marginal income change, and the relative effect is given 
by 
       ⁄
  
 
      
  
                                                                     5  
                                                      
3 Properties of the Gini correlation are discussed in, among others, Stark et al. (1988).   7
If remittances play a role in village income, then if   , the Gini correlation between remittances 
and total income, is negative or zero, an increase in remittances would decrease inequality; if   , 
however, is positive, then the impact of an increase in remittances on inequality depends on the sign of 
         . Inequality will increase if the inequality of remittances exceeds the inequality of total 
household income:         (Stark et al., 1986).  
The Gini coefficient decomposition is useful for examining the effects of different sources of 
income on overall income inequality. However, it cannot be used to examine whether income from 
different sources can affect income inequality arising from differences in landholdings (Leones & 
Feldman, 1998). For example, if remittance income contributes to greater overall income inequality, and 
international migration is prominent among already wealthy households, international migration may thus 
further inequality that arises between households because of differences in landholdings. The 
concentration coefficient for income source   may be written as:  
    1 2    
 
 
                                                                             6  
where   is income, as defined before,          is the cumulative distribution function for function     , 
which is a continuous function of   and everywhere greater or equal to zero and for which a first 
derivative exists (Kakwani, 1977). An alternative formulation for the concentration coefficients is given 
by:  
    1 0 . 1  19    1 7      1 5      1 3      1 1      9      7      5      3      1                 (7) 
where the    are the shares of income for each source that accrue to each decile. Deciles may be based on 
household rankings by, for example, income or landholding. The concentration coefficient for total 
income is the sum of the concentration coefficient for each income source times its share of total income 
or      ∑          , where    represents the share of income source   in total income. Taking household 
labor and production decisions as given, we can assess the impact of an exogenous change in each 
household’s income component   by a factor of  , such that          1        . The concentration 
elasticity may be calculated as:  
 
   /  
  
   
      
  
                                                                               (8) 
Migration and Poverty 
To analyze the poverty implications of migration and remittances, a modification of the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (FGT) poverty index can be used. If we let        ,   ,…     represent household income in 
increasing order and   0  denote the predetermined poverty line, the FGT poverty measure is defined 
by: 
   ;    
1
        
 
 
   
                                                                     9  
where   is the total number of households,       ;   is the number of poor households,           is 
the income shortfall (the gap between the household’s income and the poverty line) of the k-th (poor) 
household, and   is a parameter. This index satisfies the two axioms formulated by Sen (1976; 1979) for 
poverty measures and confirms (1) that a reduction in the income of a poor household, ceteris paribus,   8
increases the poverty measure (monotonicity); and (2) that a pure transfer of income away from a poor 
household increases the poverty measure (the transfer axiom). 
Three variants of the FGT poverty index are used to estimate the impacts of changes in migration 
on rural poverty: the head-count measure   0 ,     ;    
 
  measures the incidence of changes in 
migration on rural poverty (i.e., the share of the population living below the poverty line); the poverty gap  
  1 ,     ;    
 
  ∑      
 
      measures the depth of poverty, or how far below the poverty line the 
average poor household’s income falls; and finally, the squared poverty gap   2 ,      ;    
 
    ∑            
     measures the severity of poverty and is sensitive to changes in the distribution of 
income among the poor (Taylor et al., 2005).  
Migration and Social Welfare 
Changes in inequality do not have unambiguous implications with regard to social welfare. To assess the 
relationship between migration and social welfare, we use a social welfare function invoking direct 
welfare judgement as proposed by Stark and Yitzhaki (1982).  
      1                                                                            10   
where     is mean village income, as defined before. Using this measure of social welfare, we can assess 
the impact of a small percentage change in income from source   on village welfare by a factor of  , such 
that          1        , that is 
                  1           ⁄ ⁄    
  
                                                   11  
The derivative of mean income with respect to   is given by      , the mean income from source  . The 
derivative of    is given by equation (4). If we substitute these two derivatives into (11) and rearrange, 
we obtain the following expression: 
  
  
       1                                                                           12  
where    is the Gini correlation of income from source   with total income and    is the Gini index of 
income source  . Equation (12) states that the effect of a small change in an income source on welfare 
depends on an income effect given by      , which is always positive and a distributional effect          , the 
sign of which depends on the effect of income from source   on inequality (Stark et al., 1986).  
   9
5.  FINDINGS 
When we are interested in issues of poverty and distribution, income averages such as those in Table 2 
conceal as much as they reveal. If it is true that remittances from international migration accrue to the 
already better-off households, while poor households produce very few long-distance migrants, then the 
direct effects of these remittances might well be to worsen the distribution of real income. Figure 1 shows 
the estimated density functions of the logarithm of household per capita income for the different 
migration regimes as well as for all households.  
Figure 1. Kernel density estimates of household income 
 
Notes: kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = .2 
In Figure 1 the density function for internal migrant households is similar to the general density 
function. However, the distribution for international migrant households is shifted toward the right, 
reflecting higher incomes for these households. In contrast, the function for nonmigrant households is 
shifted toward the left, reflecting lower incomes. For nonmigrant households, almost half of the function 
lies to the left of the $0.50/day ultra-poverty line, implying that almost half of nonmigrant households live 
in absolute poverty (Ahmed, Vargas Hill, Smith, Wiesmann, & Frankenberger, 2007).4 Among 
international migrant households, ultra-poverty is much less prevalent than among households in the other 
groups. It should also be noted that distributions of international and nonmigrant households are more 
dispersed compared to the other distributions.  
The Gini decomposition in Table 3 reveals interesting differences between remittances from 
internal and international migration and inequality.  
 
                                                      

















8 9 10 11 12
Log of per capita income
All households International migrant households
Non-migrant households Internal migrant households  10
Table 3. Gini decompositions of income  














% change in Gini 
coefficient 
Staple cropping  0.52
  0.38  0.73  0.41   -0.11 (-0.20,- 0.03)
a 
Cash cropping  0.10  0.69  0.42  0.08   -0.02 (-0.04, 0.01) 
Livestock
  0.06  0.88  0.64  0.09    0.04 (0.01, 0.06) 
Nonfarm activities  0.20  0.68  0.60  0.23  0.03 (-0.01, 0.08) 
Remittances (internal)  0.05  0.86  0.37  0.05  -0.01 (-0.02, 0.02) 
Remittances (international)  0.08  0.94  0.57  0.10  0.04 (-0.01, 0.06) 
Total income 
  1.00 0.35    1.00  0 
Notes:
 a Bootstrapped percentile confidence intervals in parentheses 
The source Gini is highest for international remittances compared to all other income sources. 
Although a high source Gini does not imply that an income source has an unequalizing effect on total-
income inequality, as an income source may be distributed unequally favoring the poor (Taylor et al., 
2005), Table 3 also shows that remittances from international migration have a much larger share in total-
income inequality compared to remittances from internal migration. The Gini correlation of remittances 
from internal migration is comparatively low, 0.37, indicating that internal migration remittances favor 
the poor more than any other income source does. The last column of Table 3 shows that remittances 
from internal migration have an equalizing effect on the distribution of total rural income. In contrast, a 1 
percent increase in international remittances increases income inequality, and more so than increases in 
any other income source. 
Concentration coefficients are calculated by income source based on total income ranking, and on 
landholdings. Unlike the Gini coefficient, which is always positive, the concentration coefficient may be 
negative if the correlation between the ranking variable and income from a source is negative and large.  
Table 4. Decomposition of the concentration coefficient for income 
 Concentration  coefficient  Elasticities 
  Income 
share 
Income Land  Income  Land 
Total income 
  1.00 0.33  0.10    0  0 
Staple cropping  0.52
  0.27  0.11   -0.10   0.03  
Cash cropping  0.10  0.29  0.14  -0.01   0.03 
Livestock
  0.06 0.55  0.15  0.04    0.02   
Nonfarm activities  0.20  0.40  -0.02  0.04  -0.23 
Remittances (internal)  0.05  0.33  -0.04  -0.01  -0.07 
Remittances (international)  0.08  0.51  0.43  0.04   0.22  
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Table 4 shows that the concentration coefficient elasticities based on income rank are very similar 
in magnitude and sign to the Gini coefficient elasticities. However, when households are ranked 
according to landholdings, concentration coefficients are very different. Coefficients for both nonfarm 
income and remittances from internal migration are now negative, indicating that the more land is 
available to the household, the less income it is likely to obtain from nonfarm activities and internal 
migration. It should also be noted that although most coefficients are much smaller when incomes are 
ranked according to landholding, the coefficient for remittances from international migration changes 
only slightly and far exceeds all the others, indicating that the greater the landholdings of a household, the 
more income it is likely to obtain from international migration, bearing in mind that in the absence of a 
land market, migration cannot influence landholdings. Both nonfarm income and internal remittances 
reduce income inequality between households with different landholdings. An increase in remittances 
from international migration has a strong positive effect on income inequality.  
The combined findings of the decomposition of the Gini and the concentration coefficients lend 
support to the hypothesis of internal migration as a survival strategy in which a household sends out a 
migrant to an internal destination at a low cost in response to an income shortfall, possibly related to 
limited landholdings. International migration, instead, appears to be an accumulation strategy enabling 
already well-off households to further improve their income position relative to other households.  
The contrasting findings of the unequalizing versus the equalizing effect on household income of, 
respectively, international and internal migration are similar to those of Taylor et al. for rural Mexico 
(2005) for areas with low prevalence of the former and high prevalence of the latter. Long-distance 
international migration, which is risky and costly, involves so-called pioneer migrants from households at 
the upper middle or top of the sending area’s income distribution so that remittances accrue to already 
wealthy households, widening income inequalities. Although the idea cannot be tested here, it is possible 
that as access to migrant labor markets becomes diffused through the growth and elaboration of migrant 
networks, households at the middle or bottom of the income distribution could gain access to migrant 
labor markets, dampening or reversing the initial unequalizing effect of remittances.  
In order to estimate the effects of changes in migration and remittances on poverty, a poverty line, 
z, is required. Although a national poverty line for Burkina Faso exists for the year in which the survey 
was held (82,672 FCFA), applying this line to the data would mean that 93 percent of households would 
have to be considered poor. As the normal proportion of the population below the poverty line is around 
50 percent (International Monetary Fund, 2005), this poverty line does not appear appropriate here. In the 
absence of any other poverty lines emerging from the literature for Burkina Faso, I  opted to use the 
poverty line for the ultra-poor, those living on less than $0.50 a day. 
Table 5. Poverty measures  
  α=0  α=1  α=2 
All households  0.3318 (0.03)  0.1150 (0.01)  0.0560 (0.01) 
Nonmigrant households  0.4557 (0.06)  0.1686 (0.03)  0.0850 (0.02) 
Internal migrant households  0.2946 (0.04)  0.0993 (0.02)  0.0479 (0.01) 
International migrant households  0.1563 (0.07)  0.0371 (0.02)  0.0134 (0.01) 
Notes: N=223 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Table 5 shows that households with international migrants are less poor by all three variants of 
the FGT poverty measure. Within the group of households with international migrants, less than a fifth 
are living below the poverty line, compared to about half and a third, respectively, for nonmigrant and 
internal migrant households. The poverty gap is also smaller for households with international migrants; 
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Welfare changes vary dramatically across income sources. Similar to the findings of Stark et al. 
for rural Mexico (1986), the most dramatic improvement in welfare results from a marginal increase in 
nonremittance income, and in particular in staple cropping. Welfare gains from a marginal increase in 
remittances from internal migrants are small but slightly larger than those from a marginal increase in 
remittances from international migration. As shown in Table 2, remittances from international migration 
are much larger than those from internal migration. The limited impact of an increase in remittances from 
international migration on village welfare can be attributed to the distributional effect, which weakens the 
income effect.    14
6.  CONCLUSION 
The impact of migration and remittances on inequality, poverty, and social welfare depends on migrant 
destination as well as on the diffusion of migration opportunities within a community. Using Gini 
decomposition, we find a negative relationship between internal migration and inequality and a positive 
relationship between the more costly and risky long-distance international migration and inequality. The 
concentration coefficient decomposition reveals that remittances from international migration accrue to 
households with larger landholdings, whereas the opposite holds for remittances from internal migration. 
International migration thus appears to be an accumulation strategy for already wealthy households, 
whereas internal migration merely makes up for the income shortfalls of comparatively poor households.  
Households with international migrants are found to be much less poor in terms of head-count, 
depth, and severity measures, suggesting that international migration in particular could play an important 
role in poverty reduction. However, the limited prevalence of migration among poorer households 
negatively affects its capacity for poverty alleviation. Results from social welfare analysis shows that 
welfare gains from an increase in international remittances are small due to the limited distributional 
effect.  
In combination, these findings show that despite the importance of remittance income as an 
income source, its role in poverty alleviation is limited by the infrequency of international migration 
among poorer households that face liquidity, risk, and perhaps other constraints to distant labor markets. 
Households participating in international migration strongly benefit, but beneficiaries do not appear to 
include the rural poor. The distribution and poverty impacts of international migration are dependent on 
the diffusion of migration opportunities. Although it has been suggested that migration opportunities will 
spread to poorer households over time, policymakers may play an important role in facilitating and 
accelerating this diffusion.  
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